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ABSTRACT
The growing differentiation of services based on Big Data harbors the potential
both for greater societal inequality and for greater equality. Anti-discrimination law and
transparency alone, however, cannot do the job of curbing Big Data’s negative
externalities while fostering its positive effects.
To rein in Big Data’s potential, we adapt regulatory strategies from behavioral
economics, contracts and criminal law theory. Four instruments stand out. First, active
choice may be mandated between data collecting-services (paid by data) and data-free
services (paid by money). Our suggestion provides concrete estimates for the price range
of a data-free option, sheds new light on the monetization of data-collecting services, and
proposes an “inverse predatory pricing” instrument to limit excessive pricing of the
data-free option. Second, we propose using the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent
contracts that unreasonably favor data-collecting companies. Third, we suggest
democratizing data collection through regular user surveys and installation of data
compliance officers partially elected by users. Finally, we trace back new Big Data
personalization techniques to the old Hartian precept of treating like cases alike and
different cases differently. If it is true that a speeding ticket over $50 is less of a disutility
for a millionaire than for a welfare recipient, the income- and wealth-responsive fines
powered by Big Data that we suggest offer a glimpse into the future of the mitigation of
economic and legal inequality by personalized law. As we present these different
strategies, we show how data collection can be coupled with attempts to prevent
discrimination and exploitation of users. Finally, we discuss all four proposals in the
context of different test cases: social media, student education software and credit and
cell phone markets.
Many more examples could and should be discussed. In the face of increasing
unease about the asymmetry of power between Big Data collectors and dispersed users,
about differential legal treatment, and about the unprecedented dimensions of economic
inequality, this paper proposes a new regulatory framework and research agenda to put
the powerful engine of Big Data to the benefit of both the individual and societies
adhering to basic notions of equality and non-discrimination.
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The promise of Big Data is big indeed: thanks to algorithms, clinical research
allows seemingly unrelated symptoms to uncover the adverse effects of medicines;
“smart grids” reduce energy consumption; congestion and pollution levels in cities can be
reduced; and tailor-made education generates better learning outcomes.1
However, the side effects of new Big Data techniques have revealed both consumer
protection and discrimination issues that lead us to an ever more unequal society. In
addition to problems for all consumers, Big Data poses particular risks to vulnerable
groups. Since basic life opportunities are based on predictive scoring, people are sorted
into the “wheat” and the “chaff” for, inter alia, their health, housing, employment and
travel opportunities.2 Opaque or incorrect scoring may result in significantly worsened
economic conditions for those negatively affected.3 Moreover, personalization can
disadvantage individuals when it is predicated on negative assumptions embedded in the
very structure of the algorithm or biased towards the preferences of a statistical majority.4
As the “scored society”5 unfolds, every inch of the lives of individuals is recorded,
measured, quantified and analyzed by an increasing array of data-collecting companies,
data brokers and software tools. Big Data analytics have created estimated global
revenues of $122 billion in 2015, an amount expected to increase by more than 50% over
the next five years.6 Academics have extensively examined the impact of unilateral
access to behavioral algorithms in the area of personalized advertising,7 showing how
adverse targeting leads to suboptimal contracts.8 As Ryan Calo observes, firms have an
incentive to engage in individualized ‘market manipulation’ whereby each consumer is

1
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012).
2
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION 3–11, ch. 2 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2014).
3
Id. at 13–16; see CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY, ch. 10 (2015).
4
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming, 2016).
5
Moreover, in the wake of the Big Data economy, research has shown that government use of
database screening can create blacklists of individuals and virtually reverse the presumption of innocence.
See Margaret Hu, Big Data Backsliding, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015). Equally troubling, search engines
are said to be able to influence election outcomes, Robert Epstein & Robert E. Robertson, The Search
Engine Manipulation effect (SEME) and its possible impact on the outcomes of elections, American
Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, (2015), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/112/33/E4512.full.pdf.
6
Press Release, IDC, Worldwide Big Data and Business Analytics Revenues Forecast to Reach
$187 Billion in 2019 (May 23, 2016), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS41306516
[https://perma.cc/H7M2-DGUE].
7
Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1016–18 (2014).
8
Emir Kamenica, Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, Helping Consumers Know Themselves,
101 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 417, 418 (2011) (reporting on adverse targeting, i.e., the conscious
offer of sub-optimal contracts by companies to clients on the basis of the superior information of
companies about the future use and spending patterns of their clients); for an overview of the interaction
between Big Data, and other digital technologies, and contract law, see Stefan Grundmann & Philipp
Hacker, The Digital Dimension as a Challenge to European Contract Law, in: EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Stefan Grundmann ed., forthcoming).
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targeted on the basis of his or her specific set of biases or approached at a time when he
or she is most vulnerable.9
However, this bleak picture conceals the potential of personalization through Big
Data for the law of the future.10 Smart technologies enable differentiation of market
transactions on an unprecedented scale. Depending on the underlying rationale for
differential treatment, Big Data can be used to either entrench illegitimate discrimination
or to reduce inequality. As with every new technology, this ambivalence is deeply
inscribed into the very code of Big Data. The challenge for the legal regime is to facilitate
the positive externalities of Big Data while reining in its potentially discriminatory use
Algorithmic transparency and due process11 are suggested as a necessary
procedural antidote to some of the Big Data malaise. People deserve not only to access
and correct their information but also to know how they are rated and ranked.12
Importantly, the Snowden revelations have demonstrated how social awareness can bring
about reforms in other areas of privacy concern.13 Transparency regulations moreover
carry a “relative political ease”14 and proposed smart disclosure policies such as “visceral
notice”15 can help consumers make better-informed choices about services powered by
data. But can transparency work on its own to combat troublesome discriminatory uses of
Big Data or do we need to think of other methods of regulation?
While much ink has been spilled on remedying behavioral market failures that arise
from personalized advertising,16 adverse targeting17 or more generally, the interplay of
competition and cognitive biases,18 legal scholarship has only recently started to discuss
regulatory solutions that address harms generated by Big Data. This article adds to the
debate in two respects. First, unlike in other areas where federal law and the courts are
9

Supra note 8, at 1007–18, and 1033.
See, e.g., Philipp Hacker, The Ambivalence of Algorithms. Gauging the Legitimacy of
Personalized Law, in: PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND IP LAW – TOWARDS
A HOLISTIC APPROACH? (Mor Bakhoum, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt & Gintare
Surblyte, eds., forthcoming); id., Personalizing EU Private Law. From Disclosures to Nudges and
Mandates, EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2914393; on
personalized law more generally, see Ariel Porat & Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014); O. Ben-Shahar & A. Porat, Personalizing
Negligence Law, 91 NYU L. REV. 627 (2016).
11
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014).
12
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2; PASQUALE, supra note 2.
13
The Snowden revelations triggered a significant public debate and legislative overhaul of
surveillance measures that eventually led to the replacement of the Patriot Act with the USA Freedom Act
of 2015. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline
Over Monitoring Act of 2015. P. L. 114–23, §1(a).
14
Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Petitions and Institutional Legitimacy, CARDOZO L. REV
(forthcoming 2016).
15
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1027 (2012).
16
See, e.g., FREDERIK ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF
BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING (2015).
17
Kamenica, Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 8; PHILIPP HACKER, VERHALTENSÖKONOMIK UND
NORMATIVITÄT [Behavioral Economics and Normativity] (forthcoming, on file with authors).
18
See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 14–18 (2012); GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS (2015); Michael Grubb, Overconfident Consumers in the
Marketplace, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2015).
10
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struggling to translate privacy losses into privacy harms,19 the unfair techniques with
which data might be extracted for analytics can result in tangible economic harms that
might substantially disadvantage some individuals.20 We show how Big Data can
multiply discrimination in new and subtle ways. Second, we demonstrate how
individualization through Big Data can actually be deployed to fight discrimination more
effectively. Ultimately, we suggest regulatory strategies that couple transparency with
some substantive protections to eliminate the danger of multiplying inequality through
Big Data and instead enhance the prospect of improving equality.21
In Part I we outline the main challenges for the law posed by Big Data. First, we
argue that through “smart discrimination” and “dual valence correlations,” Big Data is
able to take societal inequalities to the next level. Second, we unearth Big Data’s lessexplored potential for remedying inequalities. In Part II, we outline the limits of some of
the traditional approaches to Big Data in what we call “transparency as accountability”
and “transparency as disclosure.” Thus, we develop a framework for reining in the big
promise of Big Data through a new research agenda that combines transparency with
substantial regulation. First, to prevent discrimination, we propose concrete strategies for
offering data-free services next to unconscionability and the ex post evaluation of
contracts. Furthermore, we analyze democratizing data collection as a regulatory tool.
Finally, the paper is the first to suggest income or wealth-responsive fines as a way of
remedying inequalities through the use of Big Data. Part III tests our premises in three
case studies: social media, student education software and credit and cell phone markets.
Part IV presents the tentative conclusions.

I. BIG DATA AND THE LAW: MAJOR CHALLENGES
¶7

Data analytics lead to greater personalization of services. Before the advent of Big
Data, consumers would, for the most part, see the same advertisements and receive the
same offers. However, Big Data has changed the rules of the game. Individuals are
treated differently now, based on their metadata such as their browsing history, their
shopping behavior, or the articles they read in electronic newspapers. At the first level,
this creates a problem of awareness, salience, and consent. As has been noted by
numerous scholars, recent surveys suggest consumers’ and users’ unease with data
collection and data mining. A survey conducted in 2015 by the Pew Research Center
shows that only 7% of U.S. adults were somewhat or very confident that their record
would remain private and secure with online advertisers.22 Fifty percent of U.S. adults
19

Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011).
For a categorization of harms provoked by algorithmic decision-making, see Pauline T. Kim,
Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
21
For a detailed discussion of the interaction between legal equality and personalized law, see
Philipp Hacker, The Ambivalence of Algorithms. Gauging the Legitimacy of Personalized Law, in:
PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND IP LAW – TOWARDS A HOLISTIC
APPROACH? (Mor Bakhoum, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt & Gintare Surblyte, eds.,
forthcoming).
22
Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. 7 (May 20, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americansattitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/PUU2-BJ7J ].
20
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would like to prevent online advertisers from saving records of their activity for any
length of time;23 and more than 90% of U.S. adults would like to be in control of the
information others can collect from them.24 In the 2014 Pew Research Center survey,
more than nine out of ten U.S. adults noted that consumers have lost control over
companies’ online collection and use of data.25 Nonetheless, the vast majority of citizens
continue to use data-collecting services such as Google or Facebook without sufficiently
protecting their privacy by means of proxy servers, encryption, TOR, or other technical
measures.26 This points to a flagrant attitude-action gap that regulation, including the
tools we shall propose, can help close. Consumers often do not have the necessary
technological knowledge to protect their privacy. Further, lock-in or network effects
explain why many users of social networks remain faithful to the services they receive,
even if their privacy is compromised.27 The market does not seem to offer effective
mechanisms to narrow the attitude-action gap on its own, and the consequences can be
dire, especially for vulnerable groups.
Importantly, however, we argue that at the second level, beyond privacy concerns
and consent, the growing differentiation of services based on personal data harbors the
potential for both greater societal inequality and for greater equality— i.e., Big Data is
instrumental for both more and less discrimination.28 The reason for the Janus-faced
character of personalization can be traced back to Hart’s precept of treating like cases
alike and different cases differently.29 This basic tenet is reflected to some extent in the
U.S. constitutional tradition of anti-subordination that “impugned facially neutral
practices with a racially disparate impact, while legitimating affirmative action,”30 and it
has also been spelled out by the European Court of Justice: “ [d]iscrimination consists
solely in the application of different rules to comparable situations or in the application of
the same rule to differing situations.”31 Treating different individuals differently does not
per se amount to discrimination or foster inequality. Rather, the core question is whether
the respective situations are comparable, which in turn depends on whether good reasons
can be advanced for distinguishing one individual from another. The ambivalence of Big
Data arises from the fact that differential treatment can be premised upon a variety of

23

Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RES. CTR., 3 (Nov.
12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [https://perma.cc/X5NSBDEU].
26
Madden & Rainie, supra note 22, at 8–9.
27
In order to fight lock-in effects, in 2012 the European Commission proposed a far-reaching data
portability right in its data privacy legislative reform package. The currently adopted EU-wide general data
protection regulation introduces a mellowed down version of the right. See Art. 20 of Regulation 2016/679
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J., (L 119) 45.
28
This applies both to intentional discrimination and remedial discrimination.
29
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599
(1958).
30
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition— Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12 (2003).
31
Case C-283/83, Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, E.C.R. 1984, 3791, para. 7.
24
25
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personal characteristics and can be deployed to either combat or entrench discriminatory
practices.
A. Big Data Exacerbating Inequality
¶9

Along with problems generally associated with consumer protection, the use of Big
Data creates inequality whenever it facilitates the differentiation between persons based
on traits of their personality or patterns of their behavior thought to be discriminatory,
such as traits identified within a protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.32 As Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale,33 Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst,34 as
well as Tal Zarsky35 and others,36 have persuasively argued, the use of correlations
uncovered by data science gives rise to inequality on an unprecedented scale triggered by
what we term here “smart discrimination.” Consider the example of racial discrimination:
in the old days, this type of discrimination was often rather obvious. The refusal to sell
goods to consumers because of the color of their skin, or even the refusal to ship
merchandise to ZIP code areas predominantly inhabited by African-American or Latino
communities, was a clear sign of racial discrimination.37 This is not to say that more
subtle forms of discrimination did not exist before the advent of Big Data.38 However,
one of the striking characteristics of the era of Big Data is the ability to uncover
counterintuitive correlations. Therefore, it is now possible to differentiate seemingly
neutral characteristics that, while unnoticed by the general public, correlate with
discriminatory traits. Examples include the distance from home to work (which can
correlate with racial background),39 criminal records (which can correlate with racial
background),40 or individual working days versus holidays (which indicate religious
beliefs).41 If these correlations become integrated into the search algorithms of platforms

32

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17.
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2.
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4.
35
Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375
33
34

(2014).

36
See, e.g., Toon Calders and Indr Žliobait , Why Unbiased Computational Processes Can
Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 43 (Bart Custers, Toon Calders, Bart Schermer,
& Tal Zarsky eds., 2013).
37
See Toon Calders & Sicco Verwer, Three Naïve Bayes Approaches for
Discrimination-Free Classification, 21 DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 277, 278 (2010); cf.
Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1394–95.
38
See, e.g., Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. .REV.
SOC. 181 (2008).
39
Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2013) (citing the case of
“Evolv”, an employment consultancy, which leaves this variable out of their models for fear of
discrimination),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-youat-work/354681/
[https://perma.cc/2ASH-HNEB].
40
Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201 (1997).
41
Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1395.
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offering goods and services, Big Data will allow for subliminal forms of discrimination to
which we turn below.
1. Dual Valence Correlations
¶10

Why would the providers of platforms implement such discriminatory strategies in
the first place? The answer is fourfold. First, discrimination can be based on institutional
arrangements that follow patterns of implicit, rather than intentional, bias.42 Institutional
discrimination has received significant attention in the sociological literature43 and might
be considered a key driver of the persistence of discrimination in the post-civil rights era.
This is also highlighted by the so-called ‘Podesta Report’ on the ambivalent impact of
Big Data issued by the Executive Office of the President.44 Second, machine learning
procedures may perpetuate biases inherent in the data used to train the algorithm, an issue
we address in more detail below.45 Third, it might be the case that the provider either
harbors explicit discriminatory feelings or gains utility by discriminating against
consumers based on their racial background, sexual orientation, etc.46 Fourth, there is the
so-far underappreciated47 potential for discrimination arising from the interplay of market
forces in which the providers themselves are neutral but they respond to the
discriminatory preferences of other market actors. As Christine Jolls and Ian Ayres have
persuasively argued, such “rational” discrimination can be the product of profit
maximization under certain constraints.48
¶11
While others have dealt with the first example (institutional discrimination),49 we
now turn to some cases that illustrate the other three categories just mentioned. A
problem of inequality arises when certain parameters for personalization of offers have a
dual valence—i.e., when they correlate in a statistically significant way both with traits
42
This is the form of discrimination Barocas and Selbst focus on. See Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 4, at 3-4.
43
See, e.g., Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 185, 198; Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M.
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded from Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on
Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 5 (1987).
44
Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values 45–47
(2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YMX9-QXHV] .
45
See infra notes 50 et seq. and accompanying text; for an overview, see, e.g., Indre Zliobaite, A
Survey on Measuring Indirect Discrimination in Machine Learning, Working Paper (2015),
https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00148.
46
See, e.g., Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1385–86.
47
But see Alistair Croll, Big Data Is Our Generation’s Civil Rights Issue, and We
Don’t Know It, SOLVE FOR INTERESTING (July 31, 2012), http://solveforinteresting.com/big-data-is-ourgenerations-civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/L24Q-4CN4]; however, discussion in
the legal literature of market forces leading to discrimination has been scarce so far, with the partial
exception of Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 22–23, 44, and a brief mention in Zarsky, supra note 35, at
1387.
48
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 685–86 (2003);
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817, 842–44 (1991).
49
See supra note 42.
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that would constitute a legitimate reason for differentiation and with discriminatory
traits.50 Let us consider the hypothetical case of an online platform that sells used cars. In
deciding whether to make an offer to a potential buyer, the platform provider analyzes the
payment history of the buyer on the basis of information they collect on their own and
through related platforms; furthermore, as far as possible, the provider gathers
information on the buyer’s credit history. From the data, the platform calculates a
combined credit and payment score (CCPS). To potential buyers with a better CCPS, the
platform makes cheaper offers for the same types of cars than to buyers with a worse
CCPS. The platform provider defends this strategy by noting that buyers with a lower
CCPS are costlier since they are more likely to default on their payments. Taken on its
own, this would constitute a sufficient economic reason for price discrimination.51
However, let us further assume that the CCPS also correlates with racial characteristics:
African-Americans, for an intricate set of reasons stemming largely from the educational
system,52 tend to have lower CCPSs. Thus, the algorithm provides the car dealer with a
tool to discriminate against African-American consumers while ostensibly following an
economic rationale. This concern is not entirely theoretical: in a much-cited study
conducted before the advent of Big Data, Ian Ayres and colleagues were able to show
how car dealers’ offers depend heavily on the racial background of the offeree, with
African-American consumers getting worse deals than white consumers.53 If anything,
Big Data and the sharing economy can exacerbate the trend.54 For example, Benjamin
Edelman and colleagues have demonstrated in an oft-cited field experiment that users
with African-American names are 16% less likely to be accepted by Airbnb hosts than
their white counterparts.55 Additionally, David Wang and colleagues show, with data

50
Cf. Calders & Verwer, supra note 37, at 279; Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1389; Barocas & Selbst,
supra note 4, at 20–22.
51
Cf. Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry about When We Worry about Price Discrimination? –
The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 70–74 (2014).
52
See, e.g., RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER, ch. 8 (2011).
53
Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995). This narrative is part of a broader problem: as computer scientists have
pointed out, it is extremely difficult to construct attributes with predictive quality that are uncorrelated to
any discriminatory traits. See, e.g., Calders & Verwer, supra note 37, at 278 (noting that “simply removing
the sensitive attribute from the training dataset does not solve the problem, due to the so-called ‘red-lining
effect’,” i.e., indirect discrimination through correlations). Therefore, whichever target variable is chosen
for data mining, there will always be a potential for – conscious or unconscious – discrimination.
54
Benjamin G. Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
17), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701902 [https://perma.cc/M2EE-L33L] (discussing the rise of discrimination
in the sharing economy in general); Alex Rosenblat, Karen Levy, Solon Barocas & Tim Hwang,
Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Bias, INTELLIGENCE & AUTONOMY (October
2016), http://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Discriminating_Tastes_Customer_Ratings_as_Vehicles_for_Bias.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3TT-NCJU] (identifying customer ratings of Uber drivers as a potential transmission
vehicle for racial bias).
55
Edelman, Luca & Svirsky, supra note 54, at 3.
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from California, that Asian-American hosts on Airbnb earn 20% less for a single
bedroom rental than white hosts.56
¶12
What is new about this phenomenon? Certainly, economic reasoning linked to the
risk of default has been used in the past to veil discrimination. Given the persistence of
biased preferences in the digital economy, Big Data, however, presents an entirely new
stage in the history of discrimination precisely because it allows for hitherto unnoticed
correlations to take center stage. Even seemingly mundane and harmless characteristics
of personalization might mask illegitimate discriminatory preferences.57 This is
particularly problematic in the case of dual valence correlations since the “legitimate
correlation” may present a sufficient justification to pass the antidiscrimination test under
the disparate treatment58 and the disparate impact doctrines59 of Title VII.60 The current
account of the antidiscrimination doctrine holds that disparate treatment cases concern
intentional discrimination based on a protected characteristic such as gender or race,
while disparate impact cases target practices that are facially neutral but might have
discriminatory effects. However, due to the currently narrow interpretation of “disparate
impact” by the Supreme Court, antidiscrimination law alone does not seem equipped to
deal with the cases we described above.61 Therefore, the law must leave the comfortable
path of traditional antidiscrimination law to fight these new types of data-driven
discrimination. This is what Part II.B. of the article will address.
2. “Smart Discrimination”
¶13

Next, consider the example of a platform offering apartments for rent. As is well
known, and corroborated by the recent Airbnb study,62 some landlords have a biased
56
David Wang, Stephen Xi & John Gilheany, The Model Minority? Not on Airbnb.com: A
Hedonic Pricing Model to Quantify Racial Bias against Asian Americans, TECH. SCI. (September 1, 2015),
http://techscience.org/a/2015090104/ [https://perma.cc/68KB-WRN4].
57
Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 23.
58
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989) (holding that if a mix of motives
led to a decision by an employer, one of the motives being illegitimate, “the defendant may avoid a finding
of liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even
if it had not taken the plaintiff's [discriminating feature] into account”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the “burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection”).
59
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2015) (establishing that a hiring practice with disparate
impact is legitimate if it is job-related and a business necessity); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at
41 (noting that “there is good reason to believe that any or all of the data mining models predicated on
legitimately job-related traits pass muster under the business necessity defense”).
60
On business justification in the context of Title VII, see Jolls, supra note 48, at 665–66; Richard
A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 517–18, 522
(2003); for a detailed analysis of discriminatory data mining in the light of Title VII, see Barocas & Selbst,
supra note 4, at 24–46.
61
But see Pauline T. Kim, supra note 19, at 38–43. Kim suggests a revisionist reading of Title VII
that advances a prohibition on classification bias in the employment context. We are sympathetic to this
reading of the text that optimizes the advantages of workforce analytics while curbing its risks. However,
with Kim, we are skeptical too since, as she writes, “existing doctrinal forms often exert gravitational pull
on our thinking.”
62
Edelman, Luca & Svirsky, supra note 54, at 1.

11

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2017

penchant for white and well-educated tenants.63 Let us further suppose that access to the
hypothetical platform is free for potential tenants but charges a service fee to the
landlords when they offer their apartments for rent. The provider will have an incentive
to implement a discriminatory search algorithm under two conditions. First, it must know
of the landlords’ discriminatory preferences, which can be reasonably assumed given the
empirical data available. Second, the discriminatory strategy must not be noticed by the
majority of the persons discriminated against (for fear of public outrage, or
discontinuation of the use of the platform by this group). Under these conditions,
algorithmic discriminatory strategies may be implemented as a screening device to
channel the “better” potential tenants—e.g., the white and well-educated—to the
landlords’ offers. The landlords’ willingness to pay a higher service fee to the provider
will depend on the perceived “quality” of the applicants they receive through the
platform, thus creating an additional incentive for the provider to channel the kind of
tenants that landlords would like to see responding to their offers. However, the success
and popularity of the platform would also depend on having as many users as possible.
Therefore, an openly discriminatory strategy would, beyond legal concerns, be
economically inefficient. Thus, the provider will have an incentive to covertly tweak the
algorithm in a way that, for non-white users, rearranges the list of apartments. If,
moreover, service fees are calculated on the basis of monthly rent, the more expensive
apartments will be more profitable for the provider. Ultimately, maximizing the
satisfaction of apartment owners will be of the highest priority for the platform provider.
An economically efficient, discriminatory search strategy could therefore rearrange the
list of apartments so that the more expensive ones are displayed first to white users.64
This would hinder access to high-quality housing for non-white users.
¶14
The described effect is particularly relevant to areas of the law that ban
discrimination in public offerings of goods or services. Examples include the US Fair
Housing Act65 or Sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act,66 and, in Europe, the
EU Antidiscrimination Directive.67 However, a similar effect can also raise Title VII
employment issues if the employer reckons that their customers or coworkers will have
discriminatory preferences and decides to adapt his or her recruitment policy
accordingly.68 We see Big Data opening the realm of hidden or “smart” discrimination,
which can go unnoticed by those discriminated against. Algorithmic discriminatory
strategies might be used either by persons actively seeking to discriminate against others
or by those seeking merely to maximize their revenue. The use of algorithms creates
unfortunate economic incentives for “dual valence” and “smart” discrimination.

63
Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 188–89; see also John Yinger, Measuring Racial
Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986).
64
For empirical data on such price steering mechanisms, see Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David
Lazer, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson, Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce
Web Sites, in: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 305,
309-310 (2014).
65
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2015).
66
See Ayres, supra note 48, at 821.
67
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180/22), art. 3(1)(h).
68
See Jolls, supra note 48, at 686–87.
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B. Big Data Mitigating Inequality
¶15

While Big Data undoubtedly harbors the potential to expand illegitimate
discrimination in new and subtle ways, it could also contribute to greater economic
equality. For several years now, both lawyers and economists have been debating the
impact of mounting economic inequality in Western societies and potential strategies for
battling this worrying tendency.69 Conspicuously left out of the picture so far is the farreaching potential for mitigating economic inequality by organizing both markets and the
legal system by means of Big Data. Ideally, the very same strategies used to decrease
economic inequality simultaneously serve to foster legal equality. In Part II, we shall
argue that wealth- and income-responsive fines could fulfill this dual goal.70
¶16
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the opportunity structures that Big Data
creates for “dual valence” and “smart” discrimination. However, the same strategies can
be tweaked to differentiate between different market actors in a legitimate way. Imagine
the aggressive tendencies of the discriminatory car dealer exhibited when the price
charged for a certain good is actually positively correlated with the income or wealth of
the offeree. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Amazon is in fact already using such price
discrimination strategies to demand higher prices from Mac users than from Windows
users, the rationale being that the average consumption budget of a Mac user is higher
than that of a Windows user.71 If the type of operating system used is indeed a fair proxy
for one’s consumption budget, which in turn depends crucially on income and wealth,
then the strategy used by Amazon does incrementally lower economic inequality. A
similar effect can be achieved by geostrategic pricing in which the price of a good is
determined by the location of the IP address of the user or by the ZIP code of the
shipping address.72 More generally, to the extent that algorithm-driven price
discrimination increasingly approximates the reservation price of the potential buyer, it
should, on average, lead to higher prices for more affluent buyers who tend to have a
greater ability to pay for products.73 While this statement needs to be qualified for some

69
See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer,
trans., 2014); FRANÇOIS BOURGUIGNON, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INEQUALITY (Thomas Scott-Railton,
trans., 2015); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY. HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012); WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 52; David Grewal, The Laws of
Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2014)); for a sweeping critique of the impact of Big Data on inequality, see CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION. HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY
(2016).
70
Infra, Part II.B.4.
71
CHRISTOPH KUCKLICK, DIE GRANULARE GESELLSCHAFT. WIE DAS DIGITALE UNSERE
WIRKLICHKEIT AUFLÖST [The Granular Society: How Digitization Dissolves our Reality] 129–30 (2014);
similar tactics are reported of the travel website Orbitz, see Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to
Pricier Hotels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.
72
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
73
On price discrimination in the digital economy, see Hannak et al., supra note 64; ARIEL
EZARCHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION 85-130 (2016); id., The Rise of Behavioural
Discrimination, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 485 (2016).
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algorithmic pricing techniques,74 the law, we suggest, can use similar data-driven
strategies to combat economic and legal inequality in unprecedented ways.

II. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
¶17

This brings us to a discussion of potential regulatory solutions for the challenges
just described. Simple bans on data collection would often not work, either because they
are overreaching, potentially unconstitutional,75 and politically inopportune, or because
the huge advantages of data collection and processing for companies and consumers
would immediately create a black market with even less oversight. What may be
practicable, however, are some mild regulatory steps designed to minimize the harms of
discriminatory uses of Big Data and enhance equality through data collection and
processing.
¶18
The first and most frequently promoted regulatory tool puts an emphasis on
transparency. We outline the different contexts in which transparency-as-accountability
and transparency-as-disclosure to the consumer is invoked. However, the limits of
disclosure brought about with new empirical research in behavioral and experimental
economics lead us to consider, as a second step, substantial forms of regulation. By
decreasing company access to citizen data, these regulations aim not only to make
citizens aware of the algorithms that sort them, potentially reducing the attitude-action
gap in the privacy domain, but more importantly to significantly limit the amount of data
available to companies in the first place. If data is the source of discrimination in the
digital age, reducing the availability of the data of some users will reduce the potential for
discrimination. This particularly holds true if vulnerable groups are given the ability to
opt out of data collection. Furthermore, the regulatory tools we contemplate leverage Big
Data in novel ways to combat economic and legal inequality. In order to explain the
necessity for such proposals, however, we shall first critique the current focus on
transparency as an absolute antidote to data-driven evils.

74
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 6 (2015) (noting
that price steering and price discrimination may also have a regressive effect: “the economic intuition that
differential pricing allows firms to serve more price-sensitive customers at a lower price-point may even be
overturned. If price-sensitive customers also tend to be less experienced, or less knowledgeable about
potential pitfalls, they might more readily accept offers that appear fine on the surface but are actually full
of hidden charges.”) Generally, in unrestricted price discrimination, the price perceived by the buyer should
approximate the reservation price; however, boundedly rational, inattentive and uninformed buyers will
often underestimate the final price (and thus perceive the price to be lower) if it is sufficiently shrouded by
hidden charges, see Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 505 (2006). The interactions of
these two phenomena (price misperceptions and approximation of reservation price) most likely lead to
ambivalent consequences of price discrimination concerning economic equality; cf. also ARIEL EZARCHI &
MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION 85-130 118, 120 (2016).
75
Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that since the First
Amendment protects the right to create knowledge, data is speech; if accepted, such an understanding
makes any ban on data collection constitutionally suspicious).
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A. Parceling out Transparency
¶19

Transparency figures prominently on the agenda of rule makers, whether as a part
of the revived76 parlance of ‘good governance’ of the 2000s in international relations and
administrative law or as a top feature of the ambitious open government initiative of
President Obama in the domestic realm.77 It is argued that the modern turn to
transparency dates back to “the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—well before the Internet—as
reform-oriented politicians, journalists, watchdog groups, and social movements gained
new leverage.”78 Transparency is promoted throughout a wide range of contexts, but
when it comes to regulation, there has been little attempt to critically parcel out the
different components that constitute transparency as an umbrella concept.79 When is
sunlight the “best disinfectant”80 and when is it a mere first step to achieving a desired
outcome?
¶20
In the context of government accountability, transparency-as-accountability has
served its purpose well. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),81 first enacted in 1966
and amended several times since then, applies to federal executive agencies. It creates “a
judicially enforceable policy that favors a general philosophy of full disclosure . . . based
on democratic political theory and a philosophy of open government.”82 Under FOIA,
numerous requests have been made by public interest organizations and law clinics that
pursue surveillance reform and defend consumer privacy rights. The transmission belt
that FOIA offers is premised on the idea that the pressure on the government, created by
public debate as a result of the disclosures, will translate into corrective measures.
However, as the revelations of whistleblowers show, at the outer boundaries of the FOIA
model lies the realization that we cannot request information if we do not know it exists.
¶21
When it comes to the private sector, users and consumers are often unaware of the
degree to which their personal information is collected and processed by companies they
interact with. At first glance, it would seem that transparency-as-disclosure to consumers
is a sensible regulatory strategy. The definition of informational or data privacy as the
ability to determine for oneself what others may collect and how they use one’s
76
Found in the famous ‘Buon Governo-Mal Governo’ 1338-9 fresco paintings of Lorenzetti in a
room of Palazzio Pubblico in Siena, Italy, the allegory of good governance has traveled across time from
Aristotle’s Politics to 17th-18th century German economists to present-day United Nations policy
documents. See Hans-Jürgen Wagener, Good Governance, Welfare and Transformation, 1 EUR. J. COMP.
ECON. 127 (2004).
77
For the Obama administration’s wide-ranging number of initiatives in this respect, see
https://www.whitehouse.gov/open/about [https://perma.cc/H59J-2G9K].
78
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF
TRANSPARENCY 1945-1975 (2015).
79
Natali Helberger, Form Matters: Informing Consumers Effectively, (Amsterdam L. Sch.
Research Paper 2013–71, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354988
[https://perma.cc/Z4YT-PZZK] (pointing out that our first regulatory grasp is to transparency but there is
little consideration of where it works and where it does not).
80
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
81
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1989).
82
Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus FOIA
Disclosure Policy: The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally Identifiable
Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2003) (noting that despite FOIA’s
successes, the authors insist for a narrower interpretation of the statute’s privacy exceptions when the
information is in the public interest).
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information83 has entrenched a model of privacy-as-control, which in turn brought about
the Notice and Choice model for regulating consumer privacy in the U.S. There is no
generally applicable U.S. federal privacy law that mandates privacy statements. Several
sectoral laws require different degrees of disclosure of how personal information is
collected and used,84 and so do a number of state privacy laws.85 The Notice and Choice
paradigm has traditionally been oriented toward the individual consumer who is
supposed, after reading and sufficiently comprehending the terms and conditions of the
Notice, to act upon it by choosing to give or withhold his or her consent (and therefore,
exercise choice). However, the empirical benefits of consumer disclosure are increasingly
disputed and indeed seem to be limited. First, at the core of the model is an inherent
tension between the length and efficacy of privacy notices.86 Second, and equally
problematic, is the fallacy of consumers’ “free” choice that can arise from a lack of
market options or from the set of “usual suspects”: limited rationality, information
asymmetries, and collective action problems.87
1. The Limits of Transparency-as-Accountability
¶22

As Frank Pasquale has persuasively argued, when we enter the domain of Big Data,
there is an ironic mismatch between the ever-growing secrecy of companies about their
business conduct and an ever-greater quantification of individuals by these very same
companies.88 The ways in which data collection and processing are accomplished are
opaque and exclusive.89 To counter the hermetic tendencies inherent to data mining,
Citron and Pasquale have called for greater transparency in algorithmic decisionmaking90 as well as for interactive modeling.91 While this proposal would certainly
83
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). For a critique, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle &
Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin's Privacy Homo Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2014).
84
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) mandates that websites or online
services that are directed toward or knowingly collect the personal information of children under the age of
13 years, give a privacy notice. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681-728, enacted
October 21, 1998), implementing regulations at 16 CFR Part 312.
85
A prominent example, the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) requires that
any website or online service that collects personally identifiable information from California residents, as
defined by California law, posts its privacy policy. The actual scope of the statute is broader since it applies
to any website to which Californians have provided their data, see California Business and Professions
Code § 22575(a).
86
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 D DALUS 32, 36 (2011)
argues that: “[a]chieving transparency means conveying information…[however] . . . [i]f notice . . . finely
details every . . . [relevant fact] . . . we know that it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But
summarizing practices in the style of, say, nutrition labels is no more helpful because it drains away
important details, ones that are likely to make a difference.”). The use of vague and indeterminate language
in privacy notices is another persistent issue.
87
For a poignant early critique, see Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 815, 825 (1999).
88
PASQUALE, supra note 2; see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of
Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42 (2014). In the words of the authors, “[w]hile big data
pervasively collects all manner of private information, the operations of big data itself are almost entirely
shrouded in legal and commercial secrecy.”
89
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 17; PASQUALE, supra note 2.
90
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 26; PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 1, ch. 5.
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enhance oversight over data mining and shed light on otherwise obscure data processing
practices, companies’ sharing of code and models with the greater public has three key
disadvantages. First, the intricacies of data mining are often the most precious resource
for the industry; a transparency requirement would therefore not only threaten
companies’ business models but might also be opposed for hampering innovation in the
sector. Second, making publicly available the factors crucial for certain scoring
techniques might provide opportunities for those scored to act strategically—i.e., to send
artificial or exaggerated signals about the most important factors in a model. They might
thus essentially “game the system.”92 This is not only well-documented by research on
search engine optimization,93 but also more generally by economic signaling theory.94
Third, the complexity of advanced algorithms is so great that their architecture design is
often hard to fully comprehend, even by the computer scientists who contribute to
algorithmic development.95 This is a result of the collaborative dimension of generating
code in which different tech engineers contribute different pieces at different moments in
time. Finally, making behavioral algorithms understandable to the wider public would be
a daunting enterprise.96
¶23
Transparency-as-accountability can potentially work in the area of Big Data as
consumer groups, academics, or regulatory bodies can exercise pressure97 so that
businesses embed algorithms that are not prejudicial to racial or other minorities. The
success stories are still few and far between, however, and those few successes are not
terribly impressive. Disclosure has arguably been effective to some extent in other areas
of privacy concern, such as dealing with data security breaches.98 Perhaps if reputational
damage can nudge companies into changing their practices in some areas, it can also do
the trick when it comes to Big Data. One (modest) example is Facebook’s changed
default settings of geo-location on Facebook Messenger after a researcher put into place a
browser application that publicized the scope of geo-location data collection that

91

Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 28–29.
Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 20, 26 (noting, however, that in some areas gaming may
be difficult to achieve).
93
Jakub Zilincan, Search Engine Optimization, CBU INTERNAT’L CONF. PROC. (2015),
journals.cz/index.php/CBUConference2013/article/download/645/599; Amy van Looy, Search Engine
Optimization, in SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT 113 (Amy van Looy, ed., 2016).
94
Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J. LAW & ECON. 491, 511 (1981) (noting that the signaling party will focus unilaterally on
enhancing the signal and neglect other dimensions of product quality which are harder to monitor).
95
Cf. PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 6.
96
While daunting, the project is certainly not impossible, at least on the long run. An informed
minority could potentially exert a disciplining influence. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening
in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630
(1979); Citron and Pasquale suggest that the “[Federal Trade Commission] FTCs expert technologists”
could represent such a minority, equipped furthermore with supervisory powers. Citron & Pasquale, supra
note 2, at 25.
97
The public’s inability to comment on obscure source code has been said to obstruct the
effectiveness of Privacy Impact Assessments under the E-Government Act, see Citron & Pasquale, supra
note 2, at 10-11.
98
Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L.
REV.
913, (2007).
92
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Facebook effectuated through its initial default setting.99 However, the relative obscurity
of technology hides personalization from end users and watchdogs alike, limiting their
ability to object to (or express any opinion on) how individuals are steered around the
Web. If, alternatively, code is shared only with supervisory authorities, control over one’s
data is put solely in the hands of a regulatory agency, contradicting the long-lasting
perception in the U.S. of privacy-as-control and the influential rhetoric of putting
individuals back into the driver seat of their data. Ultimately, much like with the
limitations of transparency-as-accountability under FOIA, the main problem with
transparency-as-accountability in the context of Big Data remains the lack of information
on the way algorithms are built.
2. The Limits of Transparency-as-Consumer-Disclosure
¶24

The key issue with consumer disclosure is that in order for it to work, a sufficient
number of market participants needs to read, understand, and act upon the disclosed
information. To begin with, it is important to understand that even according to
traditional regulatory theory, not everyone needs to read the notice. An informed minority
can exert disciplining influence on the less-informed market participants.100 However, the
informed minority hypothesis has increasingly come under attack. On the one hand,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and others have shown in a series of papers that in the case of
end-user license agreements (EULAs), virtually no one takes the time to screen the
agreements for surprising or exploitative terms.101 The authors of the studies conclude
that an informed minority does not exist, at least with respect to EULAs. Similarly, in
their much-discussed work on the limits of disclosure Lauren Willis and Margaret Radin
have powerfully argued that the systemic neglect of disclosure is a rampant phenomenon
in many other markets, as well.102 On the other hand, even if an informed minority does
exist in some markets (such as arguably with institutional investors in financial
markets),103 the personalization effect of Big Data increasingly enables providers to
99
Aran Khanna, Facebook's Privacy Incident Response: A Study of Geolocation Sharing on
Facebook Messenger, TECH. SCI. (2015).
100
See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 96; David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277
(1986).
101
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations
of the ALI's “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2011); Yannis Bakos,
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014).
102
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. (2006); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA
L. REV. (2008) (arguing further that the attempt to educate consumers on financial matters in order to
improve the workability of disclosure is untenable at best); MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (demonstrating how the use of boilerplate
language in disclosure has degraded traditional notions of consent and contract, and sacrificed core rights
whose loss threatens the democratic order); see also OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE
THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
103
See, e.g., STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE AND
CAPITAL MARKETS, § 9: DISCLOSURE (2012).
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discriminate between better- and less-informed customers so that the spillover effects of
the presumed informed minority are substantially limited. More importantly, Big Data
would be able to identify loyalty: a loyal customer is one who does not compare shops,
and, thus, there would be no reason for businesses to offer better prices to the loyal
customer.
¶25
In response to critics, legal scholars have recently called for cognitively optimizing
disclosure. “Smart” disclosures use multilayered formats, graphic explanations, images,
traffic lights, and symbols.104 However, as empirically proven by Alessandro Acquisti
and others, people tend to perceive the disclosure as a “seal.”105 Further, in a recent
paper, Omri Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton have found that the most-often recommended
strategies for simplifying disclosure do not have an effect on addressees; in fact,
disclosees ignore equally standard and cognitively optimized privacy disclosures.106 This
study is particularly pertinent to the prospect of using smart disclosure techniques in the
realm of Big Data since the authors manipulated the design of privacy notices in what
concerns an area of particularly sensitive information—sexual practices. Despite the fact
that highly intimate data was concerned, the participants in the study took an average of
only 19 seconds to look at the cognitively optimized privacy notice and only an average
of 13 seconds for the standard version.107 The cognitive optimization of disclosures can in
fact be useful once people start reading the notice.108 However, the potential of disclosure
remains limited first and foremost because of the limited motivation individuals have to
attend to the disclosed information.109 At least in the domain of Big Data, where we have
shown that the stakes are critical for the life of the individuals concerned, the results of
Omri Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton110 should be a cautionary note for those striving to
achieve ever better salience in privacy notices. Instead, we suggest coupling disclosure
techniques that rely on the privacy-as-control paradigm with more substantial types of
regulation.
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B. Substantial Regulation
¶26

The most obvious way to tackle issues of discrimination by means of substantial
regulation is antidiscrimination law. However, traditional antidiscrimination law, as
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have convincingly shown,111 is unable to cope with
data-driven forms of discrimination. As we have noted above, this chiefly results from
the difficulty in reconciling the doctrine of disparate impact with discrimination hidden in
“dual-valence” correlations and “smart” discrimination.112 Therefore, we turn to novel
tools, which aim to give citizens greater control over their data in the first place. With this
lever, we hope to mitigate legal inequality, not through remedying and controlling
disparate impact, but through substantially decreasing access to data on which datadriven discrimination can be built. As a second step, we inquire into the potential for
actively using Big Data in regulation to combat economic and legal inequality.
¶27
Substantial regulation can take a variety of forms and draw on a large number of
regulatory tools, ranging from soft paternalistic nudges to full-blown mandates. In this
piece, we will advance four proposals that seem particularly helpful for tackling the
challenges of the lack of transparency and the rising inequality driven by smart
discrimination and dual valence correlations. Our proposals are (1) mandatory active
choice between payment with money and payment with data, (2) ex post evaluation of
privacy notices, (3) democratized data collection, and (4) wealth- or income-responsive
fines. While other valuable proposals have been put on the table,113 we enrich and
broaden the debate by introducing four novel categories.
1. Toward a Real Choice Between Payment with Money and Payment with Data:
Forcing Data Free Services

¶28

The first option consists in mandating an active choice by consumers and users
about whether to pay for an online service indirectly through their data or directly
through monetary payments. This gives citizens an “exit strategy” from data collection.
Data collection services such as Facebook create psychographic profiles on people and
infer hidden data (such as race, sexual orientation) from preference data for advertising
purposes. But Facebook and others have other plans on how to monetize this data in
surprising ways. The Facebook app could be used for all sorts of other decisions, such as
authentication, security checks, and even controlling car traffic flow.114 Beyond targeted
advertising, therefore, some Facebook-generated data might be used in areas that could
potentially have much greater impact on the individual and pose greater risk for
111

Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4.
Supra, Part I.1.
See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 22–28; VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK
171–84 (2014); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 46–59; Sara Hajian & Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Direct and
Indirect Discrimination Prevention Methods, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 241 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013). For technical proposals based on discrimination-free
classifications, see Calders & Verwer, supra note 37; Faisal Kamiran, Toon Calders & Mykola
Pechenizkiy, Techniques for Discrimination-Free Predictive Models, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 223 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013).
114
We are grateful to Chris Hoofnagle for pressing us on this point.
112
113

20

Vol. 15:1]

Hacker, Petkova

discrimination. The vulnerable car buyer or the prospective non-white tenant from our
examples in Section 1 might feel that they are more likely to be subjected to
discrimination by Facebook and therefore decide to opt for a data-free service.
¶29
The reason for a regulatory intervention in the market by a mandatory active choice
regime is twofold. First, as was noted,115 the attitude-action gap in the domain of privacy
protection by online users points to a lack of meaningful choice concerning dataprotecting alternatives to data-collecting services. Given the potential use of data in a
wide range of areas, including those with a high potential for discrimination, such as
housing or labor markets, increasing the offer or the salience of alternative, data-free
services seems crucial. Moreover, even for users who are currently aware of privacyrespecting alternatives such as the few providers offering messaging services in exchange
for monetary instead of data compensation, the lock-in or network effect mentioned
above will often make a switch to these alternatives unattractive.116 What is the use of
joining a messaging service or a social network if most of my friends cannot be reached
within it? Therefore, it seems more promising to require the big players to offer data-free
services rather than to expect the market to self-correct. Whereas such a regulatory tool
might endanger the business model of a small start-up that would be hesitant to introduce
a data-free option, big companies like Facebook and Google already have a large pool of
data due to the many users they have. Therefore, such companies can first implement our
proposal in a pilot version. Again, the existing, vast attitude-action gap suggests that
market-based self-correction strategies are currently not working properly.
¶30
While proposals have already been made in the direction of considering the
monetary effect of “free” services,117 we add to the existing literature in three distinct
ways. First, we frame the decision between data-collecting and data free-services as an
instantiation of “active choice,” a technique analyzed extensively in the behavioral
scholarship. This allows us to uncover the necessary conditions for this mechanism to
function adequately. Second, we provide a concrete estimate for the possible price range
of the paid option compared with the data-free option, streamlining the debate on the
monetization of “free” services and the economic value of data.118 Third, we offer an
analysis of the crucial question of price control for the data-free option.
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See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
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Working Paper, March 31, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757325 [https://perma.cc/26D9-5H9C];
Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 117, at 634–40, 666–67.
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¶31

The proposal thus draws on a technique popularized by behavioral law and
economics, i.e., active choice.119 The key idea is to force providers of so far “gratuitous”
services to offer users a clear choice between two different contracts. Under the first
option, users would not be required to make any monetary payments and the providers
would be allowed to collect and process their data in return for services, as is now the
case with Google, Facebook, Microsoft’s Hotmail, and others (the data-collecting
option). Under the second option, users would make monetary payments (be it on a oneoff basis for each service or on a monthly basis) and providers would not be allowed to
collect or process any of the users’ data (the data-free option).120 Every provider of online
services would thus be required to present at least one data-free option for every service it
publicly offers on the market. As Henk Kox, Bas Straathof, and Gijsbert Zwart have
demonstrated, such a segmented market structure would maximize both consumer and
total surplus, particularly if consumers have heterogeneous preferences with respect to
privacy and tracking.121
¶32
Mandating an active choice between these two sets of options only makes sense,
however, if it can be expected to make a difference in user choice. Recent scholarship has
identified two key conditions that must be met in order for active choice to be effective.
First, fairly large heterogeneity in actor preferences between the two choice options must
be expected. The reason for this is that, if actor preferences tend to be homogenous, a
default rule tailored toward these preferences will often be more effective and potentially
less intrusive. However, in agreement with other scholars,122 we expect preferences of
users to diverge heavily on the question of whether they are willing to pay with money
instead of with data. Because the issue of data protection and privacy polarizes society
and legal discourse as few other issues do, an assumption of uniform preferences can be
safely rejected. The advantage of active choice is that users will be able to sort
themselves into categories depending on their respective preferences.
¶33
Second, users should be expected to be in a position to make a meaningful choice
between the two options. More specifically, they should be better able to make that
choice than a regulator crafting a default rule or a substantial mandatory provision. For
this condition to be fulfilled, it seems clear that additional information needs to be given
to consumers to demonstrate what is at stake in the choice between the data-collection
and the data-free option. At the moment, many users seem to be unaware of the fact that
they are indirectly paying for “gratuitous” services with their data. The most salient way
to enable a comparison between the two options would therefore be to attach a monetary
119
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CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1173 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
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120
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supervised closely to minimize illegal conduct. In this domain, the suggestion for the establishment of an
independent supervisory authority is worthwhile. See Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747994 [https://perma.cc/Z55N-E6ME].
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price tag on both. While this is simple to calculate for the data-free option, where a
monetary payment has to be made anyway, it is more difficult to estimate the value given
away by the consent to collect and process user data. Nevertheless, the salience of the
monetary consequences of choice seems crucial: in other areas of consumer choice,
empirical studies suggest that the most effective notices are those highlighting the
monetary consequences for consumers.123
¶34
What could be a good proxy for the value of user data? We use two estimation
strategies, a bottom-up and a top-down one, and test the results against the results of a
recent study.124 First, an average lower threshold for the value of user data can be
constructed by comparing the prices providers can charge for personalized and for nonpersonalized advertising, respectively (bottom-up approach). According to industry
sources, companies can charge roughly 10 times more for personalized advertising
(retargeting) vis-à-vis standard advertising. According to the same sources, 1000
personalized advertisements on Facebook mobile would cost approximately 50 cents, and
about twice that amount for the desktop version of Facebook. Thus, each personalized
advertisement costs between 0.1 and 0.05 cents. Let us further assume that the average
user sees 100 advertisements per day (a generous estimate). The revenue from
personalized advertising for a single average customer thus lies between 5 and 10 cents
per day, or between $1.50 and $3 per month. In a conservative estimate, we can therefore
say that the difference between personalized and non-personalized advertising in the case
of Facebook for a single average customer amounts to roughly $2.70. We have to add to
this the indirect revenue that Facebook and other companies generate through
personalizing advertisements on websites of third parties by using Facebook’s or other
companies’ own data. This “audience network” is a growing source of revenue in the
industry. Average revenue from third-party websites is very difficult to ascertain, but a
total spread between personalized and non-personalized advertising of roughly $4 per
month should be a good estimate. For an average user, this sum represents an estimate of
the total marginal value of permitting versus not permitting the collection of user data. At
the same time, it offers a glimpse of where a competitive price for a data-free service
might stand. While some degree of uncertainty remains, it seems highly plausible to
assume that at least the dimension (ranging $1 to $10) is correct.
¶35
This finding is corroborated by an estimate using a different calculation strategy:
comparing the total revenue of Facebook with the total number of users (top-down
approach). For the fiscal year of 2015, total revenue stands at $17.93 billion per year,125
the most significant part of this being revenue from advertising. As of the last quarter of
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2015, the total number of users was 1.59 billion.126 Thus, Facebook generates an average
of about ten dollars of revenue from advertising per user per year, or about one dollar per
month. Between the two results of the bottom-up ($4 per month) and the top-down
approach ($1 per month), we choose the one with a higher estimate since data collected
today most likely will have a significant number of uses in the future which we could not
take account of in our estimates.
¶36
This result is further strengthened by the results of a recent empirical study.127 The
authors have used a large dataset of individual bid-level data points from real-time
retargeting auctions to empirically determine the effectiveness of personalized
advertisements (or, in the jargon of the industry, “retargeting”).128 They found that more
personalization generates better predictions concerning the user’s value—i.e., it is
instrumental in estimating their purchase probability, but at a diminishing rate.129 In this
way, it also makes advertisements more effective, since advertisements tend to exhibit
greater influence on purchasers who have a higher probability of buying in the first
place.130 These, in turn, can be identified with the aid of data technologies such as digital
cookies. Finally, Aziz and Telang calculate a dollar amount of the marginal value of
personalized ads: $1.7 billion per quarter in the U.S. across the entire economy.131 In
2015, 205 million US citizens qualified as online shoppers.132 This corresponds to a
marginal value of roughly $2.8 per U.S. online shopper per month for personalized
ads.133 This number covers all e-commerce, not only one company. However, since
Facebook is one of the largest users of cookies and personalized ads,134 we can estimate
that a large fraction of this number corresponds to the marginal value for Facebook. Thus,
again, the prize for the data-free option lies within our estimated range of $1-10 per
month.
Both options, the data-collecting and the data-free, would therefore have to
feature a prominent, salient notice, which could read, for the former:

126
Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2016, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/48T5-XXHL].
127
Aziz & Telang, supra note 118.
128
Retargeting is the practice of targeting consumers who have already been in contact with a
company or a product. See Aziz & Telang, supra note 118, at 4.
129
Id. at 9.
130
Id. at 24–25.
131
Id. at 30; in fact, this is the marginal value resulting from allowing most conventional tracking
vis-à-vis only allowing the tracking of the type of browser a user uses.
132
Number of Digital Shoppers in the United States from 2014 to 2019, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/183755/number-of-us-internet-shoppers-since-2009/
[https://perma.cc/GY35-NHYC]
133
The actual amount is likely to be higher since Aziz and Telang’s baseline is minimum
targeting, not zero targeting. See supra note 118.
134
Cf. Brandon Workman & Emily Adler, Facebook Is Emerging As A Huge Engine For Driving
E-Commerce Traffic And Purchases, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/howfacebook-drive-e-commerce-sales-2014-10?IR=T [https://perma.cc/532J-86R2]; Mark Macdonald, Which
Social Media Platforms Drive the Most Sales? SHOPIFY BLOGS (Mar. 10, 2014)
https://www.shopify.com/blog/12731545-which-social-media-platforms-drive-the-most-sales-infographic
[https://perma.cc/F2HH-XXT6].

24

Vol. 15:1]

Hacker, Petkova

“For this option, you pay with your data. An average user gives away monthly
data worth about $4.”
For the data-free option, the notice could read:
“For this option, you pay with your money instead of your data. The monthly
price is $[x].”
The two major agencies involved in enforcing privacy policies, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), could develop
concrete guidelines for the framing of the notice. At least from a normative vantage point,
the rules should also be constitutional, even in the light of the compelled commercial
speech doctrine of the Supreme Court.135
¶37
A final problem with this proposal, however, is that its effectiveness crucially
depends on the price companies would charge for the data-free service. What would
prevent companies who would like to thwart efforts to change their business model from
charging prohibitive prices for the data-free option, such as $100 for a month of
Facebook’s use?136 Such strategies would particularly make data-free services
unavailable for low-income people, adding to economic inequality. Since many dataservices generate considerable network (lock-in) effects, it would not be enough to
simply rely on competition to drive down prices.137 Any efforts to constrain the freedom
of a company to charge what it deems to be a competitive price for the data-free option,
however, enter the treacherous terrain of price control by the state. Arguably, the most
one could hope for is the enforcement of a provision stating that the price of the data-free
service must be reasonable in comparison with some benchmark. Antitrust law provides
some examples of how such a strategy could be given meaning. A classical problem of
antitrust under § 2 of the Sherman Act is predatory pricing, i.e., pricing a good below
marginal cost in order to hurt competitors.138 In order to determine whether predatory
pricing occurs, one strategy is to compare prices with actual marginal cost. While
predatory pricing occurs when the prices are below marginal cost, conscious deterrence
of users from the data-free option would require pricing significantly above marginal
cost. Thus, the feasibility of enforcement hinges on the approximate determination of
actual marginal cost. As antitrust scholars Areeda and Turner have suggested, average
variable cost139 can be used as a proxy for marginal cost.140 Data on the former is usually
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much more readily available than for the latter.141 The test is thus widely used, with some
variations, by courts both in the U.S. and in the European Union.142 We therefore suggest
an “inverse predatory pricing approach” using the average variable cost test in order to
determine whether the actual price charged is reasonable.
Moreover, there is a second proxy that can be used to determine the reasonableness
of the price of the data-free option: the marginal value of data given away in the datacollection option. The direct payment in the data-free option is introduced precisely to
make up for losses generated by the impossibility of marketing data under this contract.
Therefore, the marginal value of personalized data, as calculated above, can provide a
benchmark for measuring whether prices are too high.
The final problem is that the number of people using the data-free service might
dynamically affect the marginal value. Generally, if, as a consequence of the active
choice regime, the total amount of user data available to the provider shrinks, then the
amount of training data and the predictive quality of algorithms will be reduced. Less
predictive power, however, means less marginal value. The opt-out of data-sensitive
users therefore can be expected to have spillover effects on the value of the data of those
users that will retain the data-collecting option. However, this does not disqualify our
proposal: if the data-free option is chosen only by a minority of users, it won’t affect the
marginal value of the remaining users’ data by much. If it is chosen more often, and the
marginal value is negatively impacted, the company is always free to demonstrate that the
marginal value has decreased, and to adapt the notice and pricing accordingly.143
Furthermore, our proposal can be tested in a pilot phase.
To conclude, the price should be deemed unreasonable if it is more than 1.5 times
of either average variable cost or the marginal value of personalized data. The
enforcement of such a reasonableness requirement could be left to antitrust authorities
such as the FTC, which have considerable experience with predatory pricing. It would
provide the necessary bite for a mandatory data-free option to be implemented within a
scheme of active choice.
The advantages of a scheme of active choice are clear. First, it enhances
transparency by saliently uncovering that users are indirectly paying for “free” services
with their personal data. Second, it remedies another key flaw inherent in the current
disclosure mechanism: the lack of meaningful choice. Many services today are offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. For services offered by dominant companies such as Facebook
or Google, often there is no meaningful, equally satisfying alternative. Due to network
lock-in effects, even for users who would prefer not to share their data but remain on
maintenance, and per unit royalties and license fees. The average
variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output.”).
140
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Facebook, there is no available alternative. Mandating an active choice, and thus
mandating a data-free service, puts the user back in control over whether she wants to
share data with the company in the first place. Third, we would like to note that
companies may have an intrinsic interest in implementing such an active choice regime
as well – to the extent that they wish to continue to provide their services in the EU. The
new E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)144 limits the extent to which
personal data may be collected and processed for purposes outside of the strict scope of
the contract concluded between a data-collecting company and a user: for the assessment
of the validity of consent, “utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the
performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent
to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that
contract” (Art. 7(4) GDPR). Whenever a real choice between the two types of services
contemplated in our proposal is offered, however, the performance of a contract is never
conditional on the processing of personal data – users may always choose the data-free
option to contract for the same services. Hence, our proposal offers companies a
straightforward way to comply with EU regulations – a crucial prerogative given the
steep penalties now provided for breaches of EU data protection law (see Art. 83
GDPR).145
¶42
In this section, we have argued that to the extent that data is shared less the
technique of active choice reduces the potential for discrimination for the most vulnerable
groups. It is particularly noteworthy that users who fear potential discrimination could
choose data-free option. Since discrimination can take place along a range of different
characteristics, ranging from sexual orientation to racial or social background to political
affiliations, it is also unlikely that the choice of the data-free option will become a signal
of belonging to any specific minority group (which in turn could invite discrimination
against the users of data-free service). Rather, it is to be expected that the option will be
selected for a wide variety of motives, from fear of discrimination by potentially
vulnerable individuals all the way to the conscious refusal of some consumers to share
their personal data as a matter of principle. These are legitimate motives worthy of being
supported by legal means. Price control by an inverse predatory pricing strategy, as
suggested here, ensures that even low-income users get access to data-free services, thus
incrementally contributing to mitigating economic inequality. Finally, we have shown
that introducing a data-free (paid by money) option by services powered by Big Data is
unlikely to endanger the business model of major market players that can adjust pricing
according to the marginal value.
2. Unconscionability and Ex Post Evaluation
¶43

An active choice between a data-collecting and a data-free option will only get us
so far, however. It seems reasonable to expect that at least some less-educated users
would stick with the data-collecting option and would thus remain vulnerable to
144
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discriminatory uses of their data. Since disclosure has proven unavailing in recent years,
we suggest resorting to a more intrusive but potentially more effective remedy: ex post
evaluation of the contractual validity146 of privacy provisions, both by supervisory
authorities and courts.
¶44
It is well known, however, that in the U.S. a regime of scrutiny of unfair
contractual terms by the courts is virtually nonexistent.147 The closest analogy can be
found in the doctrine of unconscionability, particularly as applied by the California
courts.148 We are therefore the first to propose an analysis of how far this doctrine can be
fruitfully applied to the ex post evaluation of the validity of privacy standards dictated by
data processing companies.
¶45
The unconscionability doctrine generally requires the fulfillment of two elements,
one procedural and one substantive. Both are necessary, but a deficiency in one can be
balanced in an overall assessment by a greater weight of the other prong.149 Case law has
established that procedural unconscionability requires the absence of meaningful choice
for one party to the contract.150 This definition is corroborated by comment d to § 208 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Procedural unconscionability further presents
when there is either oppression or surprise,151 a dichotomy also highlighted by comment
1 to § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Oppression is found
paradigmatically when there is an inequality of bargaining power, which results in the
absence of negotiation and meaningful choice. More often than not, take-it-or-leave-it
offers have met the “oppression” prong of the unconscionability standard.152 In turn,
surprise is evoked when a clause is hidden in the “prolix printed form.”153 The surprise
element also leads to unenforceability under § 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. In the realm of privacy and data protection, however, it will be difficult to find
surprise given the widespread use of data collection, sharing, and processing clauses.
Therefore, if procedural unconscionability is to have a bearing on data privacy
provisions, it must be through the oppression element.
¶46
There are two distinct problems with finding procedural unconscionability in
privacy provisions. First, a broad interpretation of oppression is not shared by all
jurisdictions.154 Therefore, a solution based on these principles would apply at most to
146
For a taxonomy of algorithmic contracts, see Lauren H. Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, STAN.
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
147
See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1159
(1976); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204, 1255 (2003).
148
IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 548–49 (8th ed. 2012). For an
analysis of California’s frontrunner role and future potential on other areas of privacy law and policy
development in the U.S., see Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 595 (2016).
149
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000);
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002).
150
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
151
Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 783.
152
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138, 145–46 (Ct. App. 1997); Ferguson, 298 F.3d
778; see also Williams, 350 F. 2d 445 (holding that gross inequality of bargaining power can lead to lack of
meaningful choice).
153
Id.
154
Cf. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 148, at 547–49.
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residents of California, leaving large parts of the U.S. out of the picture. Second, as soon
as the scheme of active choice described in the previous section is implemented, it will be
impossible to argue that there is no meaningful choice for consumers. Therefore,
unconscionability will be unhelpful for those consumers who choose the data-collecting
option under the active choice regime. Nevertheless, it may still play a prominent role as
long as there is no law enacting such a scheme.
¶47
Under current circumstances, it may thus be persuasively argued that there is
indeed an inequality of bargaining power between data processing companies and
individual users. Negotiation is totally absent from the bargaining process, and take-it-orleave-it offers are drafted by dominant firms such as Facebook or Google. These
contracts leave no reasonable alternatives for potential users. It should be noted that, at
least in California, the option to conclude a contract with another party on more favorable
terms does not hinder the finding of procedural unconscionability.155 Therefore, under the
Ferguson standard,156 oppression and, hence, procedural unconscionability may be found
in the current practice of contractual privacy provisions.
¶48
The substantive prong is generally deemed fulfilled under Ferguson when the terms
of the agreement are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.157 Other formulations
suggest it to be sufficient that the terms are unreasonably favorable to one party.158
Reasonable people will disagree on what terms exactly qualify for substantive
unconscionability under either standard. However, it seems plausible to assume that
particularly egregious and profit-making forms of data sharing and processing confer a
sufficiently unilateral advantage to data- processing companies. Examples include data
shared unrestrictedly with third parties, data used to personalize advertisements not only
within the scope of the actual service offered by the company but also on external
websites, and the generation of massive profits from this data without users monetarily
sharing in them.159
¶49
All in all, there is reason to believe that the application of the California doctrine of
unconscionability presents a way forward for invalidating the most egregious provisions
of data sharing and processing. However, it falls short of providing a solution for the
entire U.S. because of its restricted geographical scope and its incompatibility with the
scheme of active choice advocated in the previous section. The gold standard would
certainly be to include a clause outlawing inappropriate data collection, sharing, and
processing in federal and state data protection laws. Such a general clause could be
enforced publicly by the FTC and simultaneously privately through actions in civil
courts, as is the case with existing unfair trade provisions or securities regulation.
Another option would be to attach an extraterritorial element to the doctrine, much like
existing legislation, such as the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA)
does for other areas of privacy concern. Finally, the current effort of the American Law

155

Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002).
See Ferguson, 298 F.3d 778. In Ferguson, the Court held that oppression can be deduced from
an inequality of bargaining power which results in absence of negotiation and meaningful choice, thus
making the prong applicable to take-it-or-leave-it contracts, or contracts of adhesion.
157
Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1999); Ferguson,
298 F.3d 778.
158
Williams, 350 F.2d 445.
159
See infra notes 196-194 for a more detailed treatment of the unconscionability of such terms.
156
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Institute (ALI) to draft a new Restatement of Consumer Contracts might present another
opportunity to (re)introduce unconscionability into U.S. law.160
3. Democratizing Data Collection and Processing
¶50

Reconciling data collection with democratic principles and putting control over
personal data back into the hands of those being tracked can be seen as a key political and
legal challenge in the age of Big Data. The problems associated with policing code for
the general public may be overcome in the long run, but they point to the need for further
ideas about democratizing data processing and collection in the meantime.
¶51
Our first proposal consists in forcing (large) companies to routinely conduct
representative surveys among current and potential users to determine whether users
would prefer less collection and processing of their data, as well as to see the extent to
which users actually understand the bargain offered by the company. Such a requirement
would go well beyond the mere exhortation to develop codes of conduct, widespread in
other areas of privacy law in the U.S. and envisioned in the E.U. General Data Protection
Regulation.161 The surveys, while triggering only moderate immediate consequences,
would enable users, including those who are potentially more vulnerable to
discrimination, to regain an institutionalized voice. While an obligation to comply with
the findings would probably constitute too deep an intrusion into the freedom to conduct
business, companies could be required to publicly and saliently disclose the results of
their survey. Thus, future business policies of the company could be measured against the
results of the survey to ascertain whether companies voluntarily comply with the
suggestions of their users. It can be expected that the results of the survey would exert at
least a moderate disciplining influence on companies’ data policies. Repeated
noncompliance with the suggestions of the survey could be highlighted by activists or
potentially even punished by investors.
¶52
The other option is also institutional in nature and consists of the obligatory
installation of a data protection compliance officer in each company to be elected partly
by current users; the officer ought to report directly to the CEO of a company. The
voluntary spread of the institution of the data protection officer has been generally
welcomed in other areas of privacy concern and is said to have exercised a transformative
influence on the generation of a culture of compliance across the U.S. corporate sector.162
Such a position, albeit less strictly defined, is now also envisaged in the new E.U.
General Data Protection Regulation.163

160
For ALI’s timeframe, see https://www.ali.org/projects/show/consumer-contracts/
[http://perma.cc/96ZQ-FW3L].
161
Art. 40 of Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J.,
(L 119) 1. See also Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 J.L. & POL’Y
INFO. SOC’Y 356, 357 (2011).
162
KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 76–81 (2015).
163
Art. 37 of Regulation 2016/679, supra note 161.
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How could the election of such an officer by current users be operationalized? We
suggest that votes are split equally between the board of directors and users. Thus, the
totality of the votes of board members is weighted so as to correspond to the weight of
half of all votes cast. The remaining half comes from users if the user turnout surpasses a
certain threshold of, e.g., 20%. This strategy ensures that a minority of activist users is
not driving up the result of the election. However, if users do not care to read privacy
notices,164 can they be expected to cast votes for such a position at all? On the one hand,
if they do not participate in sufficient numbers, the board will appoint the officer as the
user vote is discounted to zero. On the other hand, making the issue of data use and
collection salient and explaining that users have a chance to shape the policy and
structure of the company should help instill significant incentives to vote. After all, the
strategies we propose here such as the publication of user surveys and mandated active
choice regime can all work in conjunction to increase the salience of the issue of data
collection and use by companies. The election of a data compliance officer pairs this
heightened awareness with a real, institutionalized voice for consumers.
4. Wealth- or Income-Responsive Files

¶54

Our first three suggestions were all geared toward restraining the practices of Big
Data companies. Finally, we come back to our proposal to actively combat economic and
legal inequality through Big Data. In Section I we discussed not only the negative
externalities triggered by uses of Big Data but also hinted to its potential for promoting
equality. In particular, we gave the example of positive price discrimination based on
wealth indicators by private companies such as Amazon or Orbitz.165 However, positive
price discrimination can only be a very incomplete contribution to the mitigation of
economic inequality since the resulting distributional effect would channel wealth from
buyers to sellers, but in all likelihood it would not reach out to the most economically
disadvantaged layers of society. To rein in the potential of Big Data, we thus suggest a
strategy of data-driven fines for both individuals and companies.
¶55
The most direct way of tackling inequality by means of Big Data is to couple
administrative and criminal fines with wealth or income in a progressive way, similar to
progressive income tax schemes. Such a system of what may be termed “economic
affirmative action” would not necessarily run afoul of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because “wealth” is not a protected class within its ambit;166
rather, as we argued in Part I, it would reinforce equality before the law. The question of
whether criminal and administrative fines should depend on the income and wealth of the
person fined is not entirely new. In fact, Jeremy Bentham proposed the utilityresponsiveness of fines as far back as 1789.167 In many European countries, criminal
fines (day fines) already depend on the income of the offender, but this is not the case in
164
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013).
165
Supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
166
See, e.g., OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., & JOHN M. SCHEB II, 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480
(14th ed., 2008).
167
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chs.
XII-XV (1789).
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the U.K. and the U.S. (except for rare experiments with day fines in some communities in
the U.S.).168 Finland has recently introduced income-responsive administrative fines, and
Switzerland has enacted income- and wealth-responsive administrative fines, for example
for traffic tickets.169 The rising levels of economic inequality make the debate all the
more pressing today. The question of the justification of wealth- or income-responsive
fines hinges on the legitimizing reasons for the existence of fines in the first place. If
fines are regarded merely as tools to enforce corrective or retributive justice,170 it may be
argued that they should be exactly the same for everybody independent of their social or
economic status. However, in recent decades, administrative and criminal sanctions have
increasingly been considered to be part of the toolbox of the regulator for steering
behavior.171 This is not to deny that particularly criminal sanctions also have a strong
moral and corrective or retributive justice underpinning and that both administrative and
criminal fines form part of the expressive function of the law;172 in fact, our proposal
explicitly acknowledges this dimension through the introduction of a “base fine.”173
Nevertheless, the steering component has been identified as one of the key functions of
these two types of state action.174
¶56
If this is true, then the effectiveness of a fine in deterring certain kinds of behavior,
such as traffic speeding, will crucially depend on the marginal utility of wealth or
income. In economics, the decreasing marginal utility of both wealth and income is
almost universally accepted.175 This implies that a speeding ticket over $50 will be less of
a disutility for a millionaire than for a welfare recipient. Therefore, it can be expected to
exert less of a behavioral influence on high earning or on high net wealth individuals than
others. Note that both high income and high net worth reduces the marginal utility of
money: this provides a strong reason to correct the amount of fines both for income and
for wealth. This in turn is crucial for an assessment of income- or wealth-dependent fines
from the perspective of equality before the law.176 While it seems clear that greater fines
168
Lance R. Hignite & Mark Kellar, Day Fines, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (January 22, 2014); Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay
More?, 11 REV. L. & ECON. 481, 484–85 (2015).
169
Suzanne Daley, Speeding in Finland Can Cost a Fortune, If You Already Have One, N.Y.
TIMES (April 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/world/europe/speeding-in-finland-can-cost-afortune-if-you-already-have-one.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/232M-P3MJ]; Christian Demuth, Raser büßt
Tempoverstoß in der Schweiz mit 200.000 Euro, STRAFFRE-MOBIL.DE, http://www.straffreimobil.de/ausland/bussgelder/565-raser-buesst-tempoverstoss-in-der-schweiz-mit-200000-euro
[https://perma.cc/SAD4-MMZV].
170
See, e.g., the overview in Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1811–12 (1997).
171
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 385 (1993); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473 (2004).
172
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
173
See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
174
See supra, note 171.
175
R.D. Collison Black, Utility, in 8 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 577 (2d ed.,
Steven N. Durlauf & Steven E. Blume eds., 2008); H AL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 51-52 (8th ed., 2010). The principle was already used by the 19th century
marginalists. See Richard S. Howey, The Origins of Marginalism, 4 HIST. POL. ECON. 281, 283 (1972).
176
For a general account of the interaction between personalized law and equality, see Hacker,
supra note 21.
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for high income or high net worth individuals lower economic inequality, they remain
contested under a standard of equality that holds that all citizens should be treated alike
before the law. However, as was mentioned earlier, the principle of equality not only
requires treating sufficiently similar things similarly, but also treating sufficiently
different things differently. If the raison d’être of criminal and administrative fines is to
steer behavior ex ante, it seems persuasive to argue that individual differences in the
responsiveness to fines should require different amounts of fines in the light of equal
protection before the law. The economic responsiveness to fines therefore becomes a
crucial distinguishing characteristic that significantly differentiates similar offenses, such
as speeding, by different offenders. Income- and wealth-dependent fines therefore foster
not only economic but also legal equality.177
¶57
In fact, income-responsiveness is already a landmark of administrative enforcement
against companies when fines are calculated as a fraction of total annual revenue. While
antitrust cases have attracted most attention,178 it is precisely the field of data protection
that is bound to become the successor to antitrust in terms of administrative fines.
According to the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) recently voted by the
European Parliament, a violation of its provisions can lead to administrative fines in the
amount of up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover for undertakings.179 The original
proposal of the European Commission used the language of “proportionate and
dissuasive” sanctions,180 a formula which is preserved in the final version of the
Regulation.181 Thus, from 2018 when the GDPR will go into force, both national courts
and the data protection authorities of the European Member States— their enforcement
administrative bodies—will be able to set in place “a system which provides for effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties.”182 This is a major change after the meager fines
levied on Facebook, e.g., for violation of privacy legislation in the past.183
¶58
We inquire into how Big Data can help in operationalizing the indexing of fines to
wealth and income. For example, one of the key problems in adjusting fines to income in
the countries in which it is practiced is to determine exactly the relevant amount of
income. In Germany, for example, the judge would simply ask the defendant what her
monthly income is and perform a plausibility check. However, this often leads to a vast
177
Cf. also Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 168 (arguing that income-responsive day fines
contribute to greater equality of treatment in sanctioning criminal behavior).
178
See, e.g., John M. Connor, Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International
Cartels, 6 J. IND. COMPET. & TRADE 195 (2006).
179
Art. 83(5) of the General Data Protection Regulation.
180
Recital 119 and Art. 79(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final.
181
See Recitals 151 and 152 and Art. 83(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation),
EU OJ 2016 L 119/1.
182
Art. 83(4) read in conjunction with para. 152 of the Preamble, id.
183
See PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 145. While this type of income-based weighting presents a
welcome first step, it should be coupled with wealth-responsive weighting based on a metric of the total
value of the company. This seems even easier to implement than in the case of individual actors: for public
companies, the data is freely available in the form of quarterly and annual earnings reports; for nonpublic
companies, information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has to be used.
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understatement of income by criminal offenders in an effort to lower their fines. Data
technologies can be used to automatically, i.e., algorithmically, couple the amount of
fines with the earnings and wealth data available to different agencies, for example, to the
I.R.S. Simultaneously, robust encryption techniques must be used in order to prevent
sensitive data, such as earnings statements of companies or individuals, from becoming
public. The mere transfer of data from the I.R.S. to the administrative or criminal
authorities itself does not necessitate the use of Big Data. However, a major problem lies
in the validity of the data received by the I.R.S. As is well-known and highlighted by,
inter alia, the Panama Papers, tax evasion costs the state billions of dollars every year,
pointing to a significant degree of error in the data sets available to tax authorities. Big
Data could now potentially be used to provide a better estimate of the real income and
wealth of taxed subjects. While the technologies are probably not precise enough at the
moment to constitute a firm enough basis to evaluate actual tax calculations on the
results, a significant divergence between stated income and/or wealth on the one hand
and Big Data-driven estimates of real income and/or wealth could trigger heightened
scrutiny by the tax authorities. In fact, the Belgian and Dutch tax authorities are already
using data mining to single out such “irregular” cases in order to combat tax fraud.184
Furthermore, some companies such as Kreditech185 are already leveraging the data
mining power of algorithms to calculate the risk profiles of potential lenders.186 These are
used to inform loan decisions. One key parameter for every loan decision is, obviously,
the individual’s wealth and income. The emergence of Big Data lending techniques
therefore testifies to the potential of data mining for estimating wealth and income
levels.187 In sum, if the legal and practical difficulties of interagency sharing of
184
KPMG, Big data and tax: what is the link? (2016),
http://smartalwayswins.kpmg.be/corporate/technology/big-data-and-tax [https://perma.cc/2736-SRHA];
PWC, Belgian Minister of Finance Sheds Light on Implementation of BEPS-Related Measures, TAX
INSIGHTS 2 (December 21, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/tax-controversy-disputeresolution/assets/belgium-mof-sheds-light-on-beps-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6LW-NLGT].
185
Kreditech, What We Do, https://www.kreditech.com/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/CCR86CHY].
186
For a critique of traditional and Big Data credit scoring techniques, such as the FICO score, see
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 8–16.
187
The preceding discussion also provides the key to the practical question about which fines
should be responsive to differences in income and wealth. If both essentially serve the same function, i.e.,
to steer behavior ex ante, both criminal and administrative fines should depend on the level of income and
wealth of the perpetrator; in fact, even tort damages should be modified in this way since they equally serve
a deterrent function. How can an adjustment of fines to wealth and income levels be technically achieved?
Our proposal would be to calculate a weighting factor f for fines, which takes into account both the
deviation from average income and average wealth. More specifically, the f factor could represent the
arithmetic mean of two ratios: first, the ratio of the income of the offender to average (median) income;
second the ratio of the wealth of the offender to average (median) wealth. (The formula for the fine F o of
offender o would then be: Fo = f f = [(io/im) + (wo/wm)/2] f, with f representing the base fine, io and im o’s
and the median income of the population respectively, and wo and wm o’s and the median wealth of the
population respectively. The use of the median instead of the mean affords the advantage of the median
being less affected by very low or high outliers; it is thus less distorted by existing patterns of inequality.)
The base fine would then be multiplied by the f factor to calculate the adjusted fine for the individual
offender. The base fine would be the amount charged today in systems, which do not practice any wealth or
income modifications; it thus represents the generic justice dimension of the fine. However, the base fine
should constitute a minimum threshold for the weighted fine. Otherwise, agents whose f factor is much
smaller than 1 (very poor and/or very low-income people) would be able to engage in sanctioned behavior
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information can be overcome, Big Data can help the automatic adjustment of fines to the
income and wealth of addressees, something bound to make a major contribution both to
economic and legal equality.

III. TEST CASES
¶59

The regulatory tools we highlight serve both to raise awareness for privacy
concerns connected to Big Data uses and to mitigate economic and legal inequality in a
variety of market settings. The latter objective may be achieved directly (wealth-or
income-responsive fines) or indirectly by limiting the amount of data available to
companies and by reinforcing the control of users over their data (not only via active
choice but also through democratizing data collection and processing, and mobilizing the
ex post evaluation of contracts through the unconscionability approach). We test these
proposals by hypothetically applying them to three scenarios: social media, student
education software, and markets for credit cards and cell phones. The choice of our case
studies reflects areas of increased societal concern. In all cases, we show how substantial
regulation going beyond transparency can make a difference.
A. Social Media

¶60

A first test case that has already surfaced a number of times in the preceding
analysis consists of social media services such as Facebook or Google+. While such
platforms enable unprecedented forms of communication between diffuse and locally
remote agents, their creators have also turned them into gigantic data collection engines.
The impact of personalization achieved by both companies has been noted both in the
sector of personalized advertising and as a political phenomenon such as the so-called
“filter bubbles.” 188 Moreover, recent studies have shown that Big Data analysis of user
behavior on Facebook is strongly predictive of personality traits.189 In fact, such analysis
allows for more fine-grained and more accurate sorting of users into the classical
categories of personality psychology (the “Big Five”190) than traditional psychological

at close to zero cost, which would not only reduce the deterrence effect in an unacceptable manner but also
contradict the retributive justice dimension inherent in the base fine. To sum up, everyone pays at least the
base fine; those for whom the f factor is larger than 1 pay a modified, higher fine to account for their
greater wealth and/or income.
188
See, e.g., Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Should We Worry About Filter Bubbles?, 5(1)
INTERNET POL’Y REV 1 (2016). Filter bubbles refer to the phenomenon of users’ being confronted mainly
with opinions and content which match their pre-existing views, thus driving out dissent and variety in
opinion formation.
189
Jacopo Staiano et al., Friends don’t Lie – Inferring Personality Traits from Social Network
Structure, PROC. OF THE 2012 ACM CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2012), Sept. 5-8, 2013, Pittsburgh,
PA, USA, ACM, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2370216.2370266; Mitja D. Back et al., Facebook Profiles
Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 372 (2010).
190
The locus classicus is Ernest C. Tupes & Raymond E. Christal, Recurrent Personality Factors
Based on Trait Ratings (USAF Tech. Rep. ASD-TR-61-97), Personnel Laboratory, Lackland Air Force
Base, TX, 1961. For a good overview, see Robert R. McCrae & Oliverd P. John, An introduction to the
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tests do.191 This is particularly worrisome as such analyses may unlock information that is
not only personally but also medically sensitive, and that may be used to discriminate
against certain psychological types. Thus, while Big Data can have negative externalities
for consumers more generally, such negative externalities multiply for vulnerable groups
that might or, in certain case, might not be even users of social media networks. Cyber
bulling is despicable for all of its victims, but for example revenge pornography can have
especially dire consequences for the employment and other basic life opportunities of
those affected (overwhelmingly women).192
The regulatory strategies we propose can be expected to at least mitigate these
risks. Mandating active choice between a data-free and a data-collection option can be
economically viable if inverse predatory pricing oversight of the data-free option is
introduced.193 Furthermore, as has been noted, enabling an optimally informed choice on
the options is crucial. Therefore, when it comes to social media, the notice should not
only point to the value of personal data disclosed in the data-collection alternative but
also remind users of the far-reaching consequences that access to their data can have. A
full notice prompting active choice for Facebook users may therefore be designed as
follows:
Your Choice!
You may now choose between two different options to sign up for Facebook:
Data Collection Option
Data Free Option
For this option, you pay with your
For this option, you pay with your
money instead of your data. The
data. An average user gives away
monthly price is $[x].
monthly data worth about $4.
The collected data enables the
This option does not allow for the
construction of your entire
construction of a psychological profile.
psychological profile. Each time you
log on, imagine you start a new session
with a company psychiatrist.
¶61

The reasonableness requirement for the price of the data-free option, which we
advocate, would impose a dual constraint. First, the price must remain within 1.5 times
the average variable cost of the provision of service. Second, it may not exceed the
marginal value of personalized data. While we currently lack data for average variable
cost, the latter constraint imposes a limit of $6 for the monthly price of the data-free
option of Facebook. It seems that such a reasonable price might motivate a significant

five-factor model and its applications, 60 J. PERS. 175 (1992). The five personality traits are openness,
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number of privacy-minded users to switch to a data-free option. At the very least, pricing
is prevented from becoming prohibitive by the reasonableness control we propose.
¶62
As long as the active choice regime has not been installed by legislation, courts
may resort to the doctrine of unconscionability to strike down specific privacy provisions
in EULAs or similar contracts. As was noted, the current take-it-or-leave-it nature of
privacy policies creates a significant imbalance in bargaining power and deprives users of
meaningful choice. At least under the California doctrine, the procedural prong of
unconscionability is therefore fulfilled. However, provisions also need to be substantially
unconscionable to be struck down under the unconscionability test.
¶63
At a general level, it may be argued that one potential source of substantial
unconscionability resides in the very framework of the data policies of social media
providers such as Facebook: the fact that personal user data generates massive profits
without sharing any of these profits with the users. Obviously, users gain nonmonetary
advantages from using Facebook and other social media networks. However, if these user
benefits are dwarfed by the company benefits, the doctrine concerning grossly inadequate
pricing (substantive unconscionability) could be mobilized.194 The cases coming down
under this prong of the test have traditionally compared a market price with the actual
price charged. The problem with data-collecting services is that a monetized market price
for comparable services does not exist, leaving the courts without a yardstick to
determine whether the value of data disclosed is inadequate vis-à-vis the services offered.
Nonetheless, the fact that all revenue from the data unilaterally goes to the social media
provider could motivate a finding of unfair one-sidedness. As we have seen, however, the
marginal revenue generated from personalized data of a single user likely amounts to
approximately $1-10 per month in the case of Facebook. This does not seem to make the
contract “so one-sided as to shock the conscience.”195
¶64
In any event, specific features of the data policies may qualify for substantial
unconscionability. For example, Facebook states in its data policy that “we use the
information we have to improve our advertising and measurement systems so we can
show you relevant ads on and off our Services.” [italics added by the authors] “We work
with third party companies […] who use advertising or related products […].” “We
transfer information to vendors, service providers, and other partners who globally
support our business […].”196 According to industry sources, the personalization of nonFacebook websites by means of Facebook data is a growing source of revenue for
Facebook that will likely be expanded in the future. Such selling of collected data to third
parties may be deemed “unreasonably favorable” to Facebook.197 While it may still seem
conscionable that Facebook uses user data to generate revenue via advertising on its own
website, this evaluation changes when data are sold to third parties. First, users generally
expect data to be used for advertising on Facebook; this may be less true for third-party
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websites.198 Second, this policy strikes down all barriers that would contain personal
information within the (already vast) domain of Facebook. Rather, personal data are
spread around the web, creating unforeseeable risks of data leaks and loss of control for
users while unilaterally benefiting Facebook in the generation of revenue. This causes a
profound imbalance of contractual duties so that a finding of substantial
unconscionability would be well-motivated.
¶65
Our third proposal extends to the democratization of data collection. We suggest
that large companies like Google or Facebook should be required to conduct regular
surveys among their current and potential users (who might be put off by their data
policies but nevertheless are generally interested in using their services). The survey
would generate representative data on the feelings and preferences of participants toward
the data policies of the social media providers. The results would need to be disclosed
publicly. As Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz have implied in a related context, requiring
large companies to regularly conduct surveys does not amount to an excessive burdening
of the providers.199 Furthermore, privacy protection would certainly benefit from an
institutionalized data protection compliance officer democratically elected, in part, by
users.
¶66
Finally, it is particularly relevant to change to a regime of revenue- and wealthresponsive fines for the violation of data privacy rules when dealing with highly
capitalized companies such as Facebook or Google. Any system of fixed-rate fines would
most likely fail to produce any tangible deterrent effect, as evident in the controversial
behavior of the company so far. The provision in the EU General Data Protection
Regulation mandating fines up to 2% of global annual turnover is a step in the right
direction.200 The widespread use of social networks and search engines makes our
proposal impactful for consumers generally. As our hypothetical case study has shown,
implementation of our policy proposals would give users the opportunity for making real
choices about their data when they use such services. More importantly however, our first
case study has shown the real-life impact that active choice, unconscionability, the
democratization of data collection, and wealth-responsive penalties can have for groups
that can easily suffer discrimination caused by Big Data.
B. Student Education Software
¶67

Over the past decade, the introduction of new software for individualized learning
across schools in the U.S. has generated numerous opportunities for improving the
education process while also triggering a number of legitimate concerns201 over the use of
198
But see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545, 600 (2014) (showing that a majority of respondents in a randomized survey did expect
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student data for marketing or other questionable purposes (e.g., for compiling student
profiles that can later be sold to data brokers, future employers, etc.). Since current
federal legislation offers only limited protection,202 bipartisan legislative drafts have been
introduced to close some of the flagrant loopholes.203 In the meantime, attempts to
regulate the field have also emerged in various states.204
¶68
Not all of our proposed strategies can be applied to this sector. A data-free option
might imply more expenses for poor parents on the one hand, and jeopardize the efficient
roll-out of personalized learning for all, on the other. However, implementing some of the
suggestions we have made in this article to the area of student privacy would supplement
the proposed legislation in various ways. First, as with the test case on social media, the
substantial prong of the unconscionability doctrine can be invoked if student records are
shared with third parties without parental control and solely for the enrichment of
software providers. In order to avoid being held responsible under the procedural prong
(take-it-or-leave-it offers) and still modernize the learning process, school boards might
want to have parents participate and vote in the selection of student learning software
providers. This would ensure that children’s interests are represented in a more robust
manner and would arguably increase the bargaining power of the school in negotiating
not only competitive prices but also non-discriminatory storage and use of educational
records. A troubling issue with the existing federal legislation is that it does not give
students or parents meaningful control over students’ personally identifiable information
(PII) collected by the software providers. Further democratizing the process by requiring
the software providers to conduct surveys would allow for systemic monitoring of the
parents’ and students’ actual preferences. Ultimately, subjecting schools’ contracts with
education software providers to ex post evaluation in the light of the unconscionability
doctrine would ensure that there are no abuses.
¶69
Finally, one of the prominent criticisms of the existing federal statute is that it does
not impose strong penalties. Applying a wealth-responsive fine to companies that sell
student data or use it for targeted advertising would deter them from such violations in
Having, (Data & Soc. Res. Inst. Working Paper, July 22, 2016), http://datasociety.net/output/personalizedlearning-the-conversations-were-not-having/ [https://perma.cc/C8YL-AD5K].
202
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the future without unnecessarily burdening the start-ups that are experimenting with the
development of new learning personalization software solutions. Similarly, a wealthresponsive fine can constitute a proportionate response to the concerns of some education
software providers that are unhappy with the lack of a level playing field, given that
under some of the tabled proposals fines might apply to private companies but not to the
non-profit sector or the school districts.205
C. Credit Card and Cell Phone Markets
Another example concerns more traditional markets on which customer data are
collected on a large scale, often to the detriment of customers: credit card and cell phone
markets. As Oren Bar-Gill and others have shown in a range of impressive studies,
providers use the data collected to design contracts that exploit the weaknesses of
consumers.206 These are clear cases of what Ryan Calo has called “digital market
manipulation”;207 in the economics literature, these are also referred to as “exploitative
contracts.”208 A particularly telling example is the study by Shui and Ausubel based on a
dataset they obtained from a large commercial U.S. bank.209 The bank sent offers
containing different credit card contracts to 600,000 US customers. The most popular
offer unsurprisingly turned out to contain a teaser rate with a low introductory and a high
back-end interest rate.210 The bank monitored the spending behavior of those recentlyacquired credit card customers over a longer time. The data revealed that 79% of
customers who had chosen the teaser rate had opted for the wrong contract— assuming
equal spending behavior, a non-teaser contract would have served them better.211 If—as
can be assumed— the bank uses these data to specifically offer the teaser rates to these
consumers, this is a classic example of adverse targeting.212 As Duncan McDonald,
former general counsel of Citigroup's Europe and North America credit card section, puts
it:
No other industry in the world knows consumers and their transaction
behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the analysis of
consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA. The mathematics of
virtually everything consumers do is stored, updated, categorized,
churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from every possible angle
in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by among the most
205
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creative minds anywhere. In the past 10 years alone, the transactions of
200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions of different ways to
minimize bank card risks.213
¶70

Notably for our context, credit markets offer potential not only for exploitation, but
also for discrimination. Studies suggest that racial discrimination is still prevalent in the
credit sector, with African-American and Hispanic citizens’ access to credit being
significantly restricted.214 Protected groups, moreover, generally continue to face
discrimination in consumer markets, being offered worse terms, higher prices, and less
service.215
¶71
How would the regulation we propose change the picture? First, the mandated
active choice regime would raise awareness of the prevalence of data collection in the
credit card business. Furthermore, it would enable a real choice between an offer with
higher interest rates but no data collection and one with the inverse features. Particularly
vulnerable groups may use this option to prevent explicit or implicit instances of
discrimination by algorithms. Second, unconscionability could be mobilized to invalidate
provisions in credit card contracts allowing the selling of data to third parties. A major
issue in this context would be whether a finding of unconscionability would also extend
to the transmission of data to credit-scoring companies. At least theoretically, it may be
claimed that credit-scoring companies provide useful services in the marketplace and that
they enable risk allocation. However, given the opaque nature of scoring combined with
its potentially far-reaching consequences for the scored subjects,216 it may be reasonably
argued that scoring agencies present a significant and hard-to-determine risk for the
affected party. This may motivate a finding of such a provision to be unreasonably onesided. Third, the democratization measures would require large companies to conduct
surveys on the willingness of subjects to be scored. Furthermore, companies would need
to obtain explicit consent in order to change their privacy provisions to allow more data
collection, sharing, and processing. The greatest contribution, however, may come from
the institutionalization of a data privacy compliance officer. She could monitor the
methods and purposes of data collection and blow the whistle if the data is used in
exploitative contracts to the detriment of customers. The compliance officer would
therefore regularly report to a supervisory authority such as the FTC or the CFPB
whenever practices such as those uncovered by Shui and Ausubel217 or Bar-Gill218 are
prevalent in the company.
¶72
Finally, fines which sanction violations of privacy regulation and administrative or
criminal proceedings would have to be adapted to the revenue and value of the to achieve
effective deterrence. In the case of exploitative contracts, they could be coupled with the
disgorgement of profits either to the exploited parties or to the supervisory authority.
213
Duncan A. McDonald, Viewpoint: Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, AM.
BANKER (March 23, 2007), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_58/-306775-1.html; see also
Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know about You?, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K2PY-DHQY].
214
Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 189–91.
215
Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 191–92.
216
PASQUALE, supra note 2, chs. 2 & 4; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 8–16.
217
See supra note 209.
218
BAR-GILL, supra note 18, chs. 3 & 4, particularly at 217–23.

41

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2017

CONCLUSION
¶73

This article spells out the hitherto unrecognized ambivalence of Big Data regarding
its tremendous potential not only to entrench existing inequalities but also to promote an
equality agenda in new and powerful ways. Recent scholarship has stressed Big Data’s
potential to exacerbate both intentional and unintentional discrimination. We pick up on
this problematic aspect, and expand and complicate it by unfolding the potential of Big
Data to reduce both legal and economic inequality. Big Data’s ambivalence hinges on its
unique ability to differentiate between different situations and persons, for good or for ill.
The key challenge for the law is to facilitate useful distinctions between differently
situated agents while curbing illegitimate discrimination.
¶74
We review a range of regulatory tools, which are novel in this context and can help
in achieving the ambitious task of reining in Big Data’s potential. As a corollary, some of
these approaches promote transparency, a desideratum highlighted in much of the
previous scholarship. The new regulatory models we suggest contribute to a prevention
of the exploitation of users by asymmetrically better-situated market players, but are
especially relevant for groups vulnerable to discrimination. The use of algorithmic
decision-making creates unfortunate economic incentives for new forms of
discrimination that do not easily square with the current anti-discrimination doctrine. We
have proposed four regulatory instruments. First, active choice may be mandated between
data-collecting and data-free services, coupled with a novel form of price control derived
from antitrust law. The latter feature ensures that a data-free option is not merely
hypothetical but is an economically realistic option. Second, as long as such strategies are
not enacted by law, we propose using the doctrine of unconscionability to institutionalize
the ex post review of contract clauses which unreasonably favor the data-collecting or
processing company. Third, data collection and processing should be democratized. This
can be achieved primarily through mandatory surveys of current and potential users on
the one hand, and through the institutionalization of a high-level data protection
compliance officer, to be elected by current users, on the other. Finally, we note that
income- (or revenue-) and wealth-responsive fines, both for individual persons and for
companies, provide a unique tool to couple effective and just deterrence with the
reduction of both economic and legal inequality.
¶75
This array of tools must be adapted to different contexts and situations. We
reviewed three cases in which they may bring new solutions to old problems. In the
context of social media, all four instruments can counter the increasing loss of control of
users over their own data. Education software can make use of some of the outlined
solutions. In the realm of credit card and cell phone contracts, where adverse targeting
and exploitative contracts have been both empirically and theoretically found to be
rampant, our approach may substantially curb the power of providers to unilaterally use
data to the detriment of their clients.
¶76
Many more examples could and should be discussed. In the face of increasing
unease about the asymmetry of power between Big Data collectors and dispersed users,
about differential legal treatment, and about the unprecedented dimensions of economic
inequality, this article proposes a new regulatory framework and research agenda to put
the powerful engine of Big Data to the benefit of the individual.
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